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Agency problems in economics virtually always entail self-interested agency exhibiting “insufficient”
loyalty to principal. Social psychology also has a literature, mainly derived from work by Stanley Milgram,
on issues of agency, but this emphasizes excessive loyalty – people undergoing a so-called “agentic
shift” and forsaking rationality for loyalty to a legitimate principal, as when “loyal” soldiers obey orders
to commit atrocities. This literature posit that individuals experience a deep inner satisfaction from
acts of loyalty – essentially a “utility of loyalty” – and that this both buttresses institutions organized
as hierarchies and explains much human misery.  Agency problems of excessive loyalty, as when boards
kowtow to errant CEOs and controlling shareholders, may be as economically important in corporate
finance as the more familiar problems of insufficient loyalty of corporate insiders to shareholders.
Overt conflict between rival authorities is shown to reverse the “agentic shift” – justifying institutions
that formalize argumentation such as the adversary system in Common Law courts; the Official Opposition
in Westminster democracies; discussants and referees in academia; and independent directors, non-executive
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1.   Introduction 
Wherever human beings are organized into hierarchies – command economies, 
governments, armies, or corporations – principals, situated at the top of the hierarchy, 
make decisions; and agents, located in lower positions, obey orders. To operationalize 
this, agents often have a duty of loyalty to principals. Thus, peasants must be loyal to 
Party leaders; soldiers to the military high command; civil servants to the government; 
and top corporate managers to the shareholders, the legal owners of a corporation.  
  In economics-based disciplines, agency problems describe rational utility 
maximizing agents whose self-interest leaves them insufficiently loyal to principals. Thus, 
a self-interested CEO runs her firms to maximize her own utility, rather the wealth of her 
principals, the shareholders.  
 
Agency in Economics 
Virtually all economics work on agency problems adopts, implicitly or explicitly, the 
framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976). They posit an entrepreneur, initially the 100% 
owner of her firm, contemplating an initial public offering (IPO) in which she would sell 
some shares, selling to passive outside shareholders, retaining the rest, and stays on as 
CEO. The CEO can divert corporate resources to augment her utility – for example, 
using corporate funds to buy unnecessary Lear jets, hire unqualified cronies, advance 
personal political agendas, fund pet charities, etc. Prior to the IPO, she bears the full 
cost of such things; but afterwards public shareholders share these costs. A rationally 
self-interested CEO therefore diverts more corporate funds after the IPO than before. 
Public shareholders anticipate the magnitude of this governance problem and 
correspondingly devalue the shares.  
  In other hierarchies, command and control mechanisms limit agents’ freedom of 
action. Disloyal peasants or soldiers risk quartering; disloyal civil servants risk 
prosecution. Monitoring and control costs limit these mechanisms’ effectiveness, so 
agency problems are mitigated, not eliminated. Corporations, and the economic 
institutions surrounding them, provide analogous mechanisms: transparency, board 
oversight, independent audits, independent directors, and the like. These mechanisms 
are costly to design, monitor, and enforce, and are employed to the extent that their 
benefits outweigh their costs. The cost of using mechanisms plus the remaining 
depression in firm valuation equals what Jensen and Meckling call the agency cost. Most 
of the agency literature in corporate finance evaluates the effectiveness of such “loyalty 
enhancing” mechanisms in mitigating agency costs, as evidenced by corporate 
valuations (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
 
Agency in Social Psychology 
Similar terminology arises in social psychology. Most notably, Milgram (1974) defines an 
agentic shift as occurring when one individual subordinates her actions to the judgment 
of another. However, social psychologists see problems when agents exhibit “excessive 
loyalty” to the principal. For example, social welfare would have been enhanced were 
Nazi guards less faithful agents of their Führer. The agency problem here is that the 
guards obeyed orders they should have defied: “I was only obeying orders” was not a 
defense at Nuremburg. The agency cost here is the loss due to that excessive loyalty – 
the loss due to the holocaust.   3
  From this perspective, social psychology sees the agency problem documented 
in the corporate finance literature as “excessive loyalty” to the CEO or controlling 
shareholder, rather than “insufficient loyalty” to public shareholders (Morck, 2008). For 
example, an excessive loyal board might support a takeover the CEO misguidedly 
advocates because of an agentic shift – the directors subordinating their decision-
making to the CEO. Here too, firm value falls – due to the misguided takeover – and the 
countermeasures are possible: mandating that directors meet without the CEO, order an 
independent analysis of takeovers, etc. However, these are now “loyalty blocking” 
mechanisms, not “loyalty enhancing” mechanisms.  
 
Generalized Agency Problems 
Generalizing the term agent to include anyone from whom loyalty is expected, and 
principal to encompass anyone to whom that loyalty is due, a generalized agency 
problem entails an agent exhibiting non-optimal loyalty to the principal – too little or too 
much. This covers the self-interested agent of corporate finance and the blindly loyal 
agent of social psychology. The key insight for financial economists is that behavioral 
considerations permit welfare losses from insufficient or excessive loyalty.  
 
2.    Agency Problems Generalized 
Agency theory in social psychology derives primarily from a series of social psychology 
experiments begun in 1961 by Stanley Milgram (1963, 1974), then an Assistant 
Professor of psychology at Yale, and replicated extensively thereafter (Blass, 2004).
1 
Milgram’s experiments followed the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials of senior Nazis, at 
which the defense “I was only obeying orders” came up repeatedly. This renewed 
interest in the historical observation that “loyalty” motivates many atrocities (Laski, 1919).  
 
Figure 1.  Experimental Design 
The design of Milgram’s obedience experiments at Yale in the early 1960s.  
  
     
Panel A. The bogus 
shock generator contains 
a buzzer and has wires 
running to the “teacher’s” 
seat.  
 
Panel B. The “teacher” 
(real experimental 
subject) helps strap in the 
“learner” (actor) and 
apply bogus electrodes 
Panel C. The teacher is 
taught to operate the 
bogus shock generator  
 
Source: Milgram (1974). 
 
                                                           
1 Much of what follows draws extensively from Morck (2008).   4
Milgram’s Experiment 
The experiment features a box, in Figure 1A, with switches labeled “15 volts”, “30 volts”, 
“45 volts”, and so on up to “450 volts”. The voltages are also labeled from “slight” 
through “danger severe”, and “XXX”. Wires connect this box to various parts of the body 
of a professional actor, the “learner” in Figure 1B. A noise maker inside the box mimics 
the buzz of electric current.  
  Each subject is told (falsely) the “learner” is the subject of an experiment on “the 
effects of punishment on learning and memory” and asked to assist. The real subjects, 
citizens of New Haven, CT. attracted by advertisements of cash for participation in 
psychology experiments, thus feel a financial obligation to Milgram and a sense of 
participating in important research. Milgram wore a lab coat to impress this image.  
  The subject is instructed to be the “teacher” and seated before the box. Milgram 
asks a series of questions, and the “learner” sometimes answers incorrectly. Each time 
this occurs, the “teacher” is told to apply a larger electric shock to the actor, who feigns 
increasing pain. Milgram (1974, p. 4) describes the actor’s script: “At 75 volts, the 
“learner” grunts. At 120 volts he complains verbally; at 150 he demands to be released 
from the experiment. His protests continue as the shocks escalate, growing increasingly 
vehement and emotional. At 285 volts his response can only be described as an 
agonized scream.”  
  
Figure 2.  Obedience Rates, Basic Milgram Experiment 
Fraction of ordinary Connecticut residents who directed high voltage electric 
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Source: Milgram (1974).  
  Milgram believed Americans would disobey, and intended to replicate the 
procedure in Germany to see if cultural proclivity to obedience explained complicity in  5
Nazi war crimes. He was astonished after a “test run” of Yale students dutifully 
electrocuting perfect strangers when told to, but dismissed this as “Yalies”. But the full 
experiment gave similar results. Ordinary Americans obediently electrocuted strangers 
at his command.  
Figure 2 summarizes his main results. One hundred percent of ordinary 
Americans electrocute the “learner” through 135 volts, when he demands release. There, 
about twenty percent stop obeying. Eighty percent continue administering shocks 
labeled “very strong” and “intense”, up through two hundred and eighty-five volts, when 
the “learner” screams in agony. A bit over sixty percent obediently administer shocks 
through four hundred and fifty volts, despite labels like “extreme intensity”, “danger 
severe”, and “XXX” by the voltage figures.  
 
Robustness 
Milgram repeats the experiment varying several parameters. He finds no difference in 
between male and female subjects. Moving the experiment from New Haven to 
Bridgeport has little effect. Placing the “learner” (actor) in more direct proximity to the 
“teacher” (true subject) reduces obedience only marginally.  
  Numerous researchers, including this author, replicate Milgram’s results. A 
substantial majority of subjects obediently administer maximal shocks across countries, 
including Germany (Miller, 1986); and across a wide range of subject pools and 
experimental designs (Blass 1998, 2000, 2004; see also Merritt and Helmreich 1996; 
Tarnow 2000).  
  Responding to concerns Milgram’s subjects complied because they sensed the 
actor was acting, Sheridan and King (1972) use actual shocks to a puppy. Twenty of 
their 26 subjects comply fully – six of thirteen males and all thirteen of females, though 
some of the latter exhibit distress (Blass, 1998, 2004).  
 
Figure 3.  Replicating Milgram 
The most recent replication terminated the experiment once a subject obeyed 
instructions to administer a shock above 150V. Results for the 30 subjects are 




















Source: Burger (2009).  6
  Most recently, Burger (2009) reproduces Milgram’s finding stopping at 150V (see 
Packer, 2008) and excluding anxious subjects – with both alterations designed to avoid 
causing subjects lasting psychological harm – a major criticism of Milgram’s initial 
experiments (Baumrind, 1964; Fischer, 1968; Kaufmann, 1967; Mixon, 1972). Milgram’s 
follow-up interviews suggest this discomfort afflicted his peers more than his subjects, 
for “the vast majority of participants not only were glad they had participated in the study 
but said they had learned something important from their participation and believed that 
psychologists should conduct more studies of this type in the future” (Burger, 2009, p. 2). 
Nonetheless, such restrictions are required by university ethics reviews (Elms, 1995), 
implemented largely in response to social scientists’ distress with Milgram’s experiment 
(Blass, 2000). Figure 3 illustrates Burger’s (2009) baseline findings.  
  These direct replications are buttressed by “natural experiments” – incidents in 
which people, acting as agents, engage in obviously cruel or inappropriate behavior. 
Loyal soldiers shoot strangers and loyal bomber pilots incinerate cities – simply because 
they are ordered to.  
 
3.   The Agentic Shift and Alternative Explanations 
Given this abundance of evidence, the generality of Milgram’s finding’s as a description 
of human nature is beyond doubt. Psychological and economic explanations are needed. 
Milgram (1974) posits an agentic shift, we suspend our autonomy and literally becoming 
agents of another. In doing this, he proposes a psychological pleasure of being loyal to a 
legitimate authority occludes personal ethical responsibility. However, other explanations 
are possible. Milgram’s preferred explanation follows, and then alternatives are reviewed.  
 
Milgram’s Theory of the Agentic Shift 
Milgram, appalled by his findings, never repeated the experiment in Germany. He 
concluded instead that we have an intrinsic loyalty response – an urge to obey authority 
(Blass, 2004).  
  Milgram (1974) suggests this has a genetic basis. Animals that hunt in packs, like 
wolves, sort themselves into hierarchies, headed by so-called alpha males. De Waal 
(2005) describes hierarchical social structures under alpha males (e.g. chimpanzees) or 
alpha females (e.g. bonobos), who command obedience from other apes in the troop. 
Early hominids obeying alpha males (or females) might survive a charging mastodon 
better than otherwise biologically identical lone hominids.  
 Thus,  an  agentic shift, like other behavioral decision-making short cuts that seem 
irrational a priori, might contribute to individual or group survival (Bernardo and Welch, 
2001). Certainly, the hypothesis accords with early work in political economy, such as 
Hobbes (1651) proposal that submission to organized tyranny is preferable to 
independent savagery. That obedience to authority triggers psychological wellbeing 
explains much of the misery and atrocity overlaying human history.  
  Milgram follows up with his subjects to explore why they behaved as they did 
(Blass, 2004). Most complied because they “gave their word” or felt a duty of “loyalty”. 
Many indicated they were “doing what was expected of them”. When Milgram (1974, p. 7) 
asked for a “moral judgment” on what his subjects should have done, they “unfailingly 
see disobedience as proper.” Asked why they behaved otherwise, the subjects cite  7
politeness, the inviolability of one’s word, the awkwardness of conflict, engulfment in the 
technical details of the experiment, and so on.  
  But the most universal response was the virtue of loyalty. Milgram (1974, p. 188) 
despairs that “virtues of loyalty, discipline, and self-sacrifice that we value so highly in 
the individual are the very properties that create destructive engines of war and bind 
men to malevolent systems of authority.” Since similarly deep emotions are associated 
with other biological drives, Milgram’s postulate of a neurological basis seems plausible.  
Milgram (1974, p. 8) concludes the subjects did not abandon moral reasoning, 
but “instead, it acquires a radically different focus. He does not respond with a moral 
sentiment to the actions he performs, Rather, his moral concern now shifts to a 
consideration of how well he is living up to the expectations that the authority has of 
him.”  
  This is the essence of Milgram’s agentic shift. The subject switches from the 
teleological (consequences-based) decision-making framework familiar to economists to 
a  deontological (duty-based) framework. Right and wrong are reframed as doing or 
failing to do one’s duty. Philosophy has long weighed duties as guiding ethics (Broad, 
1930, pp. 277-278). Milgram provides empirical support for deontological considerations 
affecting human decisions, and that this need not induce behavior we ex post consider 
ethical.  
Milgram (1974, p. 145-6) argues that this agentic shift is a previously 
unrecognized fundamental component of human nature; and that “the most far-reaching 
consequence of the agentic shift is that a man feels responsibility to the authority 
directing him, but feels no responsibility for the content of the actions that the authority 
prescribes.” In economics jargon, we frequently forsake the rational weighing of 
consequences and act out of loyalty because “being loyal” makes us feel good about 
ourselves.  
This might be modeled as a behavioral bias in the form of a deontological reflex – 
an instinctive pressure to do one’s duty. Or it might be modeled as a deontological 
component of utility individuals gaining utility from acts of loyalty and losing utility from 
acts of disloyalty. New theoretical constructs might well be needed in complete 
economic models of this phenomenon and its consequences.  
 
Evoked Socialized Aggression 
Although Milgram concluded that an agentic shift best explains his findings, he concedes 
other possibilities. One common allegation is that he detects a sadistic impulse, and this 
view triggered many social scientists’ discomfort with Milgram’s experiment (Blass, 
2000). This perhaps reflects a conflation of Milgram’s work with the famous Stanford 
prison experiments (Haney et al. 1973), conducted about the same time. In these, 
university students in a mock prison were cast as either “prisoners” or “guards”. Within 
days, the “guards” inflicted rapidly escalating cruelty on increasingly cowering “prisoners”.  
  The prison experiment elicited aggressive behavior by the “guards” in the 
absence of an authority figure. After the experimenters sought (ultimately unsuccessfully) 
to restrain this behavior by imposing their authority, they concluded they had to 
terminate the experiment abruptly. Thus, while both experiments imply a surprising 
situational flexibility to ethical constraints and clearly expose unflattering aspects of 
human nature, it is far from clear they expose the same ignominy.   8
  Subsequent variation on Milgram’s experiment reinforces his rejection of an 
innate sadistic impulse as an explanation for his findings. Martin et al. (1976) modified 
his experimental design by directing their subjects, secondary school boys, to raise a 
noise generator to a level indicating “a 50% risk” of permanent hearing loss. Since the 
subjects were actually closer to the noise generator than the actor feigning pain, the 
subjects were obviously exposing themselves to the greater danger. The near alignment 
of their findings to Milgram’s would appear to preclude a normally hidden enjoyment at 
inflicting pain on others as a general explanation.  
  Still, the refusal of some subjects to administer higher voltages suggests that 
heterogeneity in personality traits such as empathy might play a role, and some follow 
up work also points in this direction (Blass, 1991). Pursuing this hypothesis, Burger 
(2009) finds no correlation between subjects’ “empathy” scores and propensities to 
administer large shocks.  
 
Conformity to Perceived Norms 
Social norms are important constraints on economic behavior (Smith, 1759); constitute a 
major part of what we now call economic institutions (North, 1990); and exert an 
experimentally verified influence individuals’ decision-making (Cialdini et al.1991; 
Cialdini, 1998). We leave tips at restaurants in cities we will never visit again, surrender 
seats to the elderly, and deal honestly with strangers – all because doing otherwise 
violates social norms.  
  The social psychology literature shows that we tend to go along with the group. 
Asch (1951) asked his experiment subject which “comparison line – A, B, or C – is the 
same length as the line on the left side of Figure 4. If others in the room volubly agreed 
on line B, most subjects would agree, even though the correct answer is obviously C. 
From a series of such experiments, Asch concludes that people are remarkably prone to 
go along with a “group consensus” – even one rigged to be obviously wrong.  
 
Figure 4.  The Asch Conformity Experiments 
Subjects are shown a card with a line on it and asked which comparison line – A, 
B, or C – is the same length. In this case, the correct answer is C. However, if 
others (actually confederates) assert a different answer, most subjects conform to 




Source: Asch (1955)  9
  Milgram’s baseline subjects were alone with the experimenter, not in a group.  If 




A final class of alternative explanations attributes the obedience Milgram observes to the 
small incremental (15V) increases in shocks (Gilbert, 1981). This evokes the foot-in-the-
door effect known to students of marketing – slowly escalating a subject’s commitment is 
an effective way of modifying attitudes and behavior (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). This 
effect appears to derive from an innate need for consistency – refusing to administer a 
315V shock is difficult once one has administered a 300V shocks – or a change in self-
perception – administering successively higher voltages causes the subject to recast 
herself as the sort of person who faithfully follows instructions (Burger, 2009).  
  This class of explanations relates to the work of Kahneman and Tversky (2000), 
who shows that people’s decisions depend critically on how their options are “framed”. 
Thus, gradually increasing the voltages changes the baseline against which the subject 
judges the severity of the next electric shock. This implication – that subjects would not 
administer a 450V shock immediately, but can be induced to do so by successive 
reframings of the situation – is, as yet, untested.  
 
Asymmetric Information and Information Cascades 
Another class of alternative explanations turns on the subjects’ perception that the 
experimenter has superior information (Morelli, 1983). The experimenter, merely by 
placing the experiment in an academic setting, signals the experiment’s importance and 
legitimacy.  
  This class of arguments is familiar to students of financial economics, for it 
underpins the literatures on rational herding and information cascades (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandi, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992). If “becoming informed” is costly, a rational 
actor sometimes opts to follow another who appears well-informed. Specifically, if the 
cost of becoming informed exceeds the expected cost of occasionally mistakenly 
following an uninformed actor, it is rational to remain ignorant. Information cascades are 
readily triggered in groups of laboratory subjects (Anderson and Holt, 1997); and daily 
life examples abound: we presume more crowded restaurants have better food; we 
praise oeuvres of abstraction by already lauded modern artists.  
  From this perspective, Milgram’s subjects infer that the experimenter is informed 
and rationally opt not to become informed themselves. They participate without 
gathering information about the effect of electricity on human physiology and the 
academic value of the experiment, and without incurring the mental cost of weighing that 
information and coalescing it into a decision.  
  The importance of information cascades in actual financial decision-making 
remains unclear. Alevy et al. (2007) find professional options traders markedly less 
prone to information cascades than students, the typical subjects of experimental 
economics studies; but Drehmann et al. (2002) report no significant difference in this 
regard between experts at an international consulting firm and ordinary experimental 
subjects. Consistent with information cascades, Amihud et al. (2003) find a bimodal 
distribution of Israeli IPO subscriptions – either massively oversubscribed or pitifully  10
undersubscribed. Consistent with Gul and Lundholm’s (1995) model of endogenous 
timing given information cascades, which predicts waves of similar decisions as 
uninformed actors free-ride on apparent fresh information, Rao et al. (2001) find financial 
analysts initiating and discontinuing coverage of particular stocks en masse. Elsewhere 
in economics, evidence of information cascades is found in hiring decisions (Kübler and 
Weizsäcker, 2003), artistic success (Crossland and Smith, 2002) motion pictures 
becoming either runaway hits or flops (De Vany and Walls, 1996; though see also De 
Vany and Lee, 2001).  
  Information cascades may well play a role in Migram’s experiment and its 
replicates. Milgram (1983) acknowledges this, but counters that erroneous presumptions 
of superior information characterize many instances of profoundly costly excess loyalty. 
In the parlance of economics, excessive obedience can have negative externalities: 
interrogators waterboarding prisoners perhaps erroneously presume their leaders have 
superior information, but the social cost of this mistaken presumption greatly exceeds 
the psychic burden on the ex-interrogators. A tally of personal costs and benefits to 
becoming informed may well induce rationally ignorant interrogators, but fails to account 
for costs to others. Likewise, the cost to corporate directors of loyally approving a huge 
misbegotten corporate takeover because they presume the CEO advocating it to be 
well-informed is clearly not its full social cost of such a major corporate misadventure. In 
short, socially excessive loyalty resulting from information cascades is, nonetheless, 
excessive.  
  But rationality amid information cascades seems an inadequate explanation for 
the full scope of evidence. Few people are unaware of the danger in high voltage 
electricity, and the stated purpose of the experiment – to see if people learn faster when 
punished for mistakes – is obviously not a matter of life and death. Moreover, the 
subjects in Martin et al. (1976) were told they risked permanent damage to their own 
hearing, yet continued to administer increasing blasts of noise. An innate and unthinking 
obedience reflex seems more consistent with such behavior.  
 
4.   Voice and Loyalty: Disengaging the Agentic Shift 
Perhaps deriving utility from acts of `loyalty` elevated our ancestors` survival odds by 
facilitating hierarchical social organization. Hierarchical structures – corporations, 
governments, or economies – are found throughout modern economies. Such an effect 
would inoculate hierarchies against self-interested agents, and might explain their 
ubiquity despite the monitoring and control costs neoclassical economic casts against 
them.  
  Clearly, the immunity is incomplete, for the economics and finance literatures on 
agency problems of insufficient loyalty are theoretically compelling and empirically well-
supported. Under a wide range of economically important circumstances, insufficiently 
loyal agents clearly impose large costs.  
  However, the arguments and evidence above suggest excessively loyal agents 
might also impose important economic and social welfare costs. Understanding what 
circumstances evoke stronger or weaker utility of loyalty is therefore important, and quite 
unexplored by economists.  
  The corporate finance literature is perhaps at its most convincing when 
explaining how insufficient agentic loyalty can be augmented by institutions` – legal  11
systems, regulation, accounting standards, tax authorities, enforceable contrasts, 
incentive schemes, customary business practices, and others. If excessive agentic 
loyalty can also pose problems, our institutions might also need to assume forms that 
deter loyalty in situations where it tends to excess. To appreciate such institutions, we 




If a behavioral bias causes irrational decisions, perhaps informing people about those 
biases can let them correct for that bias so that rational decision-making is restored 
(Gergen, 1973, p. 313). The Milgram experiments were highly publicized in the 1960s 
and 1970s, yet Schurz (1985) find no time trend in the numerous subsequent 
replications.  
  Proponents of “education as liberation” from behavioral biases may 
underestimate the difficulty of this. Still, university ethics committees ended Milgram 
experiments in the 1980s, and popular knowledge of them faded. Thus, recent 
replications such as Burger (2009) need not falsify the hypothesis that awareness of 
behavioral factors reduces their effects.  
 
Figure 5.  Variant Experimental Designs 
When the “teacher” had to hold the “learner’s” hands against metal plates to 
administer shocks, obedience rates declined somewhat. At higher voltages, the 
“learner” feigns cries of agony.  
 
 
Source: Milgram (1974).  
 
Proximity 
In variants of his experiment, illustrated in Figure 5, where Milgram has subjects 
physically hold the actor’s hands to electrodes, compliance declines – slightly. This 
suggests more direct connection to the victim reduces loyalty to authority somewhat.  
  In other variants, Milgram (1974, p. 62) removes the experimenter from the lab, 
and has the “teacher” and “learner” receive instructions over a telephone. Obedience 
dropped to about one third of the baseline level. Also, several subjects who continued 
administering shocks surreptitiously delivered lower voltage shocks than ordered to; and  12
some even lied that they were delivering the shock levels required. If the experimenter 
reentered the lab, this behavior ended and subjects resumed compliance.  
  Milgram concluded that “subjects seemed able to resist the experimenter far 
better when they did not have to confront him face to face. … The physical presence of 
an authority figure was an important force.” Remarkably, proximity to the authority figure 
ordering the abuses appears far more important than proximity to the victims of the 
abuse.  
  This would seem to have immediate application in corporate governance. The 
directors and managers of a corporation are proximate to the CEO or controlling 
shareholder – he is there to direct all major decisions – and public shareholders are a 
relatively remote abstraction. Regulations mandating meetings of directors absent the 
CEO or controlling shareholder might thus make sense as ways to “remove the authority 
from the room”. If the Milgram experiment variants are a guide, distancing the decision 
makers from the CEO might be more important than bringing them closer to the 
shareholders. Yet these issues remain largely virgin territory for students of corporate 
finance.  
 
Figure 6.  Obedience Rates, Dissenting Peers Variant  
Fraction of ordinary Connecticut residents directing electric shocks through 
perfect strangers, despite voiced concerns of two peers, when ordered to do so 
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Source: Milgram (1974).  
 
Dissenting Peers 
Although most variants of the baseline Milgram experiment elicit similar levels of 
obedience, a few specific alternatives do not. One features “dissenting peers”.  
  This variant features three “teachers” – one reads the question aloud, the second 
indicates if the answer was correct, and the third (the actual subject) throws the switch to  13
initiate the shock. At 150 volts, the first “teacher” objects and walks out. The psychologist 
tells the subject to ask the questions and throw the electric switches. At 210 volts, the 
second “teacher” also refuses to continue. The psychologist then tells the subject to go 
on. The fraction of real subjects who continue administering shocks falls sharply when 
these “peers” began voicing “dissent”. Milgram (1974, p. 118) notes that “the effects of 
peer rebellion are very impressive in undercutting the experimenter’s authority.” Figure 6 
illustrates.  
  In the most recent replication of Milgram’s experiments, Burger (2009, p. 8) 
includes a “dissenting peer” variant, described thus: “The confederate showed no signs 
of hesitation until hearing the learner’s ”ugh!” after pressing the 75-volt switch. At that 
point, the confederate paused for a few seconds before continuing. After pressing the 
90-volt switch and hearing another ”ugh!,” the confederate glanced at the experimenter 
and said, “I don’t know about this.” The experimenter responded with his initial prod, 
“Please continue.” The confederate paused a few seconds, then said, “I don’t think I can 
do this,” and pushed his or her chair a few inches back from the table. The experimenter 
then asked the real participant to continue the test, picking up where the other teacher 
had left off. The confederate sat silently throughout the rest of the study and avoided 
making eye contact with the participant.” Figure 7 summarizes the results. 
 
Figure 7.  Replicating Peer Dissent 
The most recent replication terminated the experiment once a subject obeyed 
instructions to administer a shock above 150V. A “peer” administers increasing 
shocks until the actor exhibits discomfort at 90V, whereupon the peer says “I 
don’t think I can do this” and the experimenter instructs the subject to take over. 
Results for the 40 baseline runs and 30 “peer dissent” runs are statistically 
indistinguishable. A lower fraction of male than female subjects comply fully in 
the “peer dissent” variant, but these differences are statistically insignificant.  
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Source: Burger (2009). 
  However, findings concordant with Figure 6 emerge from Asch’s (1951) studies 
of conformity. If all the other people present concurred that line A was the same length 
as the line on the left in Figure 4, the majority of subject concurred even though this was 
obviously incorrect. However, if one person dissented from the incorrect consensus, the 
subjects always supported the dissident. Burger’s (2009) failure to replicate Milgram’s 
findings in Figure 7 is thus unexpected, and this discrepancy requires explanation.   14
  Milgrim’s dissenting peers were more dramatic than Burger’s, so the emotional 
volume of voiced dissent might be important. Burger used lower voltages, so perhaps 
peer dissent is more important where stakes are higher. Burger eliminated subjects he 
judged might find the experiment disturbing, so perhaps these are the sort of people 
“peer dissent” might affect most. Further work to explain this discrepancy is clearly 
needed.  
  If Milgram is correct is positing “dissenting peers” as mitigating the agentic shift – 
in economists’ parlance, reducing subjects’ utility of loyalty – this explains resources 
devoted to suppressing dissident voices by repressive regimes, or by elected political 
leaders bent certain policies. In either situation, rational decision making suffers.  
  A large literature on “groupthink” demonstrates how solidly ensconced a clearly 
wrongheaded consensus can become. Janis (1972) attributes various political disasters 
– Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, and 
America’s misadventures in Korea and Vietnam – to groupthink, defined as a 
psychological predisposition to conform to group expectations. While each of these 
fiascos might be attributed to an information cascade, detailed post-mortems expose 
clear psychological underpinnings – a feeling of wellbeing associated with conformity to 
others’ expectations. Echoing Milgram, Janis argues that groupthink can be mitigated if 
groups assign members roles as critical evaluators, group leaders remain impartial, and 
multiple groups analyze issues independently. Surowiecki (2004) develops these 
concepts further, arguing that independence and freely voiced dissent let groups make 
superior decisions while the suppression of dissent induces groupthink.  
  The “groupthink” literature goes far beyond agency problems. It is nonetheless 
clearly relevant to corporate finance because management teams and boards are 
“groups” and make important decisions (Shefrin, 2007, c. 9; Bénabou, 2008). This 
literature, though influential in other fields, has remarkably little traction in mainstream 
economics and finance, even within behavioral subfields. Financial economists studying 
decision-making by corporate boards are well-placed to correct this oversight.  
 
Rival Authority Figures 
Another Milgram experiment variant led to a complete cessation of obedience halfway 
through the experiment. As in the baseline experiment of Figure 2, it featured only one 
“teacher”. However, it now included two supervising psychologists “of approximately the 
same age and height.” At one hundred and fifty volts, one began a scripted argument 
that higher voltage was unnecessary, while the other argued for continuing the 
experiment to its end (p. 105). Confronted with discordant authority figures, the 
“teachers” sided with the psychologist who proposed ending the experiment in every 
case. Milgram (1974, p. 107) notes that “Not a single subject ‘took advantage’ of the 
opportunity to continue the shocks, and that “action was stopped dead in its tracks.” 
Figure 8 summarizes.  
  This is the most startling of all the variants Milgram reports, for it suggests that 
conflict between rival authority figures might blunt the subject’s utility of loyalty 
sufficiently to induce rational decision-making. It raises the disturbing possibility that 
destructive behavior by agents loyal to a misguided or criminal principal might be 
prevented if a rival principal criticizes what’s going on sufficiently sharply.   15
Figure 8.  Obedience Rates, Disagreeing Authority Figures Variant  
Fraction of ordinary Connecticut residents directing electric shocks through 
perfect strangers when two psychologists disagree about the need to complete 
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Source: Milgram (1974).  
 
  Similar situations clearly arise in economics: corporate shareholder meetings can 
disconcertingly resemble the parliaments of one-party states. Board elections typically 
permit only one candidate for each board position and shareholders can often only vote 
“yes” or abstain. The overt absence of alternative authority figures in these situations 
raises the clear possibility of excessive loyalty to the party in charge: whether a CEO, 
controlling shareholder, or business family patriarch.  
  Figure 8 suggests that merely hearing a rival authority voice objections can, in 
some cases at least, fully blunt the subject’s utility of loyalty, undo the agentic shift, and 
restore what economists consider normal rational decision-making. Disputes between 
rival authority figures seem to undermine our willingness to obey authority and revitalize 
our willingness to weigh alternatives rationally and ethically. Observing authorities in 
conflict seems to evoke independent thought.  
  Behavioral corporate finance might fruitfully explore the extent to which CEOs 
value harmonious board meetings. Does harmony signify good governance or a board 
incapable of tackling difficult issues?  
 
5.   Dissent as Loyalty 
If generalized agency problem occur throughout the economy and society, individuals 
can err either by acting for themselves when they should act as agents of others, or by 
acting as agents when they should be thinking for themselves. Soldiers pilfering from 
army stores exemplify our standard agency problems of insufficient loyalty, might 
soldiers killing merely because they are ordered to constitute an agency problem of  16
excessive loyalty? Bureaucrats diverting taxpayers’ money for kickbacks exhibit 
insufficient loyalty to the government; but might bureaucrats obeying their superiors’ 
orders to violate core civil rights represent excessive loyalty? Judges misusing their 
offices to extract bribes are thought insufficiently loyal to the rule of law; but are judges 
who rigidly enforce legalistic absurdities perhaps excessively loyal to that abstraction?  
  If excessive agentic loyalty is as big a potential problem as insufficient loyalty, we 
should see institutional mechanisms designed, or evolved, to restrict loyalty to authority 
where it is potentially most costly. The following are proposed as possible examples of 
institutional arrangements that successfully check excessive loyalty to authority.  
 
The Holy Office of the Devil’s Advocate 
An early example is the Holy Office of the Devil’s Advocate, also called the Promoter of 
the Faith, a senior position in the Roman Catholic Hierarchy established by Pope Sixtus 
V in 1587 for a leading scholar of Canon Law. This early Counterreformation reform 
sought to cleanse the Roman Church of its Renaissance practice of canonizing powerful 
individuals, their friends, and their relatives. The Devil’s Advocate needed a profound 
knowledge of canon law, for his duty was to challenge vigorously the character and 
miraculous credibility of all sainthood candidates. Like the second psychologist in Figure 
8, the Devil’s Advocate was required to vociferously oppose all proposed saints through 
the lengthy and legalistic process of canonization.  
  Devil’s Advocates did much to refurbish the Church’s reputation. The Holy Office 
of the Devil’s Advocate remained a prominent position in the Church until abolished by 
John Paul II in 1983. The Polish Pope proceeded to canonize fivefold more saints than 
all other 20
th century pontiffs combined, suggesting that the Devil’s Advocate was a 
significant hindrance to the advocates of prospective new saints.  
 
The Common Law and the Adversary System 
Common Law judicial systems – used in Britain and its ex-colonies, charge judges with 
interpreting general legal principles. This avoids making judges excessively obedient to 
political authorities. This limits agency problem of excessively loyal judges, but risks 
judges abuse their discretion to advance their self-interest. In contrast, the Napoleonic 
Code, the basis of the French legal system, requires judges to administer minutely 
detailed regulations, severely restricting judicial discretion, and hence judges’ scope for 
abuse of power, but renders the entire legal system vulnerable to excessively loyal 
judges enforcing executive or legislative measures Common Law judges would have 
rejected as unconstitutional.  
  Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that France’s more tumultuous early history 
exposed judges to bribes and threats from powerful litigants, escalating agency 
problems of insufficient loyalty to the nation. In they argue that judges were less subject 
to such pressures, and could therefore be trusted with more discretion.  
  Hostettler (2006) goes further, arguing that the English Civil War saw a judiciary 
divided between Royal Courts, with judges appointed by the King, and resembling 
continental courts, and relatively independent Courts of Common Law, whose judges 
ruled by precedent and tradition. The victory of the Parliamentary army, augmented by 
popular revulsion at the excesses of some Royal Courts, notably the Court of Star  17
Chamber, left the commanding heights of England’s judiciary to its Courts of Common 
Law.  
  A fundamental difference in the ways the Napoleonic Code and Common Law 
envision the law itself illustrates how the French system removes discretion while the 
English system embraces it. The Napoleonic Code and its successors in France and 
elsewhere seek to banish all ambiguity by preconceiving of every possible case and its 
correct resolution. The purpose of the French Code is to let a judge resolve any case by 
turning to the appropriate page of the Code and reading off the correct judgment. France, 
and countries that inherited or adopted French legal systems, thus have extraordinarily 
long legal codes that, in minutely intricate detail, describe in advance all possible 
permutations of conflicts and the correct decision in every conceivable case. Common 
Law countries tend instead to have relatively brief codified laws that often turn on 
whether or not a litigant acts like reasonable man or a prudent man. The Common Law 
judge, or jury, thus has wide discretion to apply common sense in resolving the case.  
  As Figure 8 indicates, one potential way to limit excessive obedience is to charge 
one authority figure with the explicit duty of criticizing another. French courts employ an 
inquisitorial system: the judge summons and grills witnesses, orders investigations, and 
actively runs his court. This gives the judge a wide scope to ascertain facts so the 
appropriate section of the Code is applied. However, there is but one authority figure in 
the court – the judge.  
  Common Law courts, in contrast, are organized around the so-called adversary 
system: each lawyer has an unassailable loyalty to her client and an active duty to 
undermine the case advanced by the other side (Langbein, 2006). Thus, neither side 
has a duty to pursue or reveal the truth, and scholars of the Continental legal traditions 
often dispute the virtue of this. However, the adversary system inserts two rival authority 
figures into each case – perhaps so the judge, and the jury are forced into a mode of 
thought conducive to rationally weighing of the evidence. Casting the lawyers as direct 
and active adversaries makes their rivalry the center of attention, evoking the rival 
authorities in Figure 8 and perhaps eliciting rational decision-making in the passive judge 
and jury. This accords with the observation of Hostettler (2006) that the adversary 
system limits judges’ ability to influence the direction of arguments.  
  The strength of the inquisitorial system is that the judge is charged with revealing 
the truth, while the adversary system instead charges lawyers with destroying each 
others’ cases. The strength of the adversary system is that it features rival authority 
figures, which might evoke rational decision making in observers – the judge and jury, 
while the inquisitorial system puts a single author figure, risking excessive deferral to the 
judge by the litigants and their counsels. How these pluses and minuses net out, in 
different branches of the Law and in different circumstances, is an empirical question as 
yet unexplored.  
  The Law and Finance literature shows substantially larger and more active 
financial systems in Common Law countries (La Porta et al. 2008). Might the adversary 
system provide better quality outcomes to litigation regarding securities law? Might the 
weaknesses of an inquisitorial system be especially troublesome for such litigation?  
  18
The Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition 
The Westminster model of parliamentary democracy likewise charges a Leader of the 
Official Opposition with the explicit duty of persistently criticizing the party power. This 
position evolved slowly after the Glorious Revolution as a way to limit first the power of 
the Kings and then the power of elected Prime Ministers (Fourd, 1964). From the 18
th 
century on, Leaders of the Loyal Opposition have been duty bound to criticize all 
government policies, and failing to do so came to be seen as disloyalty to the electorate 
(O’Gorman, 1982). A purer application of Milgram’s Figure 8 findings is hard to imagine.  
  Multi-party democracy spread to America, the European Continent, the 
Commonwealth, and beyond. In countries adhering closely to the Westminster Model – 
Australia, Canada, India, Israel, and other former British colonies that remain 
democracies – a Leader of the Official Opposition sits in Parliament directly across from 
the Prime Minister, a Finance Critic in the Official Opposition sits directly across from the 
Finance Minister, and so on. In the United States, the most senior politician in the 
legislature from a party other than the president’s serves as de facto leader of the 
opposition, and majority and minority members of various Congressional committees 
argue with each other.  
  Different countries designate their leaders of the opposition differently, but the 
existence and importance of this position is now universal among functioning 
democracies. It seems likely that these formalizations of a duty to criticize the 
government underlie, at least to some extent, the superior provision of public goods and 
services evident in democracies.  
 
Academic Discussants and Referees 
Each speaker at an academic economics or finance conference must usually endure a 
subsequent ten minute critique by a discussant – another academic charged by the 
conference organizers with highlighting any and all the speaker’s errors. Researchers 
seeking to publish must subject their work to the merciless criticism of anonymous 
academic referees, whose explicit duty is to expose errors in the research. Work failing 
either test is generally not accepted as valid by other researchers.  
  Peer review in academia is a recent innovation, dating only back to the 1960s in 
many fields. Although the first recorded peer review process was administered by Henry 
Oldenburg, the founding editor of Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, and 
the first peer reviewed journal was Medical Essays and Observations, published by the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1731, other fields took little notice (Benos et al. 2007). 
None of Albert Einstein’s major papers was peer reviewed, for example. The bottleneck 
may have been readily generating multiple copies of manuscripts, and Spier (2002) 
argues that the advent of the Xerox machine in the 1960s made peer review practical 
across all fields. Editors who charge a referee with criticizing a paper are, in essence, 
designating a rival authority the duty of criticizing the original researchers – evoking once 
again the situation in Figure 8. Prominent researchers may still have an easier time 
publishing, but the process at least the big name author is no longer an unchallenged 
authority figure.  
  Peer review is often, and probably rightly, criticized for inflicting a conservatism 
bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) upon academic journals (Editors of Nature,  19
2003). Does the advantage of conflicting authorities outweigh the costs peer review 
imposes? This too is an empirical question, as yet unresolved.  
 
6.  Agentic  Shift  as a Behavioral Factor in Economics 
Each of the examples sketched out in Section 5 involved institutions explicitly organized 
to evoke criticism of authority. The development of these institutions took centuries, 
perhaps millennia, and their success is not yet complete. America’s adversary system 
did not preclude Guantanamo Bay, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe inherited a Westminster 
model parliament, and peer review rejects the occasional path-breaking insight. But 
much of the world still uncritically obeys religious, political, judicial, and academic 
authorities – and remains largely aloof from the social and technological progress of the 
current era.  
  Business corporations, in this respect, tend to resemble one-party states rather 
than parliamentary democracies (Bebchuk, 2007). It therefore seems plausible that 
agentic shifts might induce excessive obedience in business corporations. Such an 
agentic shift might entail, for example, directors enchanted by a powerful CEO feeling a 
profound duty to live up to the CEO’s expectations, but giving little thought to how their 
actions might affect shareholders, or other stakeholders’ welfare for that matter. Mace 
(1986) presents evidence that CEOs cultivate such loyalty, and that it renders corporate 
boards largely ineffective as checks on errant CEOs.  
 
The Scope for Agency Problems of Excess Loyalty in Economics 
Jensen (1993, pp. 862-3), in his Presidential Address to the American Finance 
Association, observes that “the problems with corporate internal control systems start 
with the board of directors. The board, at the apex of the internal control system, has the 
final responsibility for the functioning of the firm. Most importantly, it sets the rules of the 
game for the CEO. The job of the board is to hire, fire, and compensate the CEO, and to 
provide high-level counsel. Few boards in the past decades have done this job well in 
the absence of external crisis. This is particularly unfortunate given that the very purpose 
of the internal control mechanism is to provide an early warning system to put the 
organization on track before difficulties reach a crisis stage. The reasons for the failure 
of the board are not completely understood ….”  
  The Milgram results, applied to boardrooms, suggest directors obtain positive 
feelings from acts of loyalty to a proximate CEO perceived as a “leader”. This reflexive 
obedience to authority is a plausible answer to Jensen’s (1993) puzzlement. The primary 
focus in the corporate finance literature has been enhancing seemingly insufficient 
loyalty to shareholders. The analysis above suggests that curtailing seemingly excessive 
loyalty to CEOs or controlling shareholders might be at least as important.  
  In a modern liberal democracy, few jobs provide more scope for unfettered 
“leadership” than that of corporate CEO. Checks and balances constrain politicians and 
judges. Corporate CEOs essentially appoint the boards that set CEO pay and preside 
over uncontested elections at shareholder annual meetings that are worthy of any Cold 
War people’s republic. CEOs can hire and fire as they please; direct capital where they 
wish; and organize and reorganize their firms as they like.  
  This system does not ensure optimal decision making. A huge literature in 
corporate finance attests to share prices abruptly plummeting when boards approve  20
obviously misguided mergers (Morck et al. 1990; Moeller et al. 2005). Misguided 
takeovers are but one example of wrongheaded capital spending, or free cash flow 
agency problems, which Jensen (1986) would counter by enhancing directors’ loyalty to 
shareholders. But curtailing their excessive loyalty to the CEO seems at least as 
plausible a solution. Akerloff and Shiller (2009) resurrect Keynes’ (1936) theory that 
psychologically-based “animal spirits” drive waves of over and under-investment, 
reiterating Keynes’ (c. 12) explanation that underlings reinforce these costly economy-
wide resource misallocations by loyally telling CEOs what they want to hear. This, they 
argue, induces booms and busts that destabilize economic growth, with considerable 
welfare loss (Akerlof and Shiller 2009).  
  Loyalty is a highly valued characteristic in most corporate cultures (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986). However, loyalty towards an abstraction, like a corporation or an 
anonymous public shareholder, may be less viable than loyalty toward a leader – indeed, 
this is the gist of much of the “leadership” literature (add cite).
2 Corporate whistle blowers, 
even those who expose serious frauds, are often rewarded with broken lives (Alford, 
2000); and terms like rat, tattletale and snitch attest to the social opprobrium of disloyalty. 
Prospective whistleblowers must be given pause by motion picture mogul Samuel 
Goldwyn’s famous bluster, “I don’t want any yes-men around me! I want everyone to tell 
me the truth – even if it costs him his job!”  
  The case of Enron is especially instructive.
3   The chairman, Kenneth Lay, 
testifying at the House Energy and Commerce Committee explained that Enron “was a 
very large corporation. It would be impossible to know everything that was going on.” 
Sherron Watkins, a financially savvy Enron executive, testified that she repeatedly tried 
to explain the situation to him, but that he either would not listen or simply “didn’t get it.” 
Addressing a congressional committee, the bankrupt firm’s new president, Jeffrey 
McMahon described “a corporate climate in which anyone who tried to challenge 
questionable practices of Enron’s former chief financial officer, Andrew S. Fascow, faced 
the prospect of being reassigned or losing a bonus.” Ms Watkins went on to describe a 
culture of intimidation in which there was a widespread knowledge of the company’s 
tenuous finances, but no-one felt confident enough to confront Mr. Skilling or other 
senior officials about it. After the déluge, Enron employees at all levels protested "I was 
only doing my job" (Cohan, 2002).  
 
Voice as Loyalty 
Eliminating all agency problems of excessive loyalty is surely as impossible as 
eliminating all agency problems of insufficient loyalty, so tradeoffs are unavoidable. The 
evolution of economic institutions should bring us towards more nuanced tradeoffs. 
Firms and countries that better limit the dual problems of insufficient and excessive 
loyalty should prosper more consistently, and their institutions should inspire imitation. 
This potential for a better balance seems especially great in corporate governance.  






  The Milgram experiment variants involving rival authorities and dissenting peers 
argue for some analog in the boardroom to a Leader of the Official Opposition in 
Parliament or an academic discussant at the American Economic Association. At 
present, the form this analog will ultimately take is unclear, for which arrangements most 
effectively check excessively agentic behavior while imposing the least drag on 
economic activity remain ambiguous.  
 
Regulation 
The Enron scandal and other instances of excessive obedience to misguided authority at 
the time prompted various measures to reshape corporate governance in America – 
most prominently, the Sarbanes Oxley Act. This reorganized the accounting industry, 
forces senior executives to sign various financial statements, and requires companies to 
establish internal control systems. Sarbanes-Oxley may well be too expensive, as its 
opponents charge (Leuz et al. 2007; Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Zhang, 2007; and 
others), and may soon be undone (Romano, 2005). The act had no apparent effect in 
limiting the scope of a second round of governance scandals in the financial sector that 
came to light in 2007 and 2008.  
  Perhaps this is because the Act merely reinforces existing penalties on errant 
CEOs and CFOs; who – entirely convinced of the rightness of their policies (Festinger, 
1957) – are unlikely to do anything differently absent overt criticism that highlights 
looming errors. A better balance may emerge from responses to the current round of 
scandals in the financial sector. Theoretical and empirical work informed by both 
economics and social psychology is needed to guide such responses. More 
comprehensive legislation to protect legitimate whistle blowers is one possible route.  
 
Dissent and Rival Authority Figures on the Board 
The corporate governance literature places much stress on non-executive chairs and 
independent directors (Herman, 1981; Mace, 1971; Weisbach, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1989; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990). While the finance literature frames these 
as mechanisms to enhance director loyalty to public shareholders; they are also 
defensible as mechanisms to disrupt director loyalty to CEOs.  
  Non-executive chairs and independent directors correlate with CEO departures 
after poor performance, but not firm valuations (Kang and Sorensen, 1999; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003).
4 Moreover, these mechanisms were in place at Enron – the CEO did 
not chair the board and the board contained a healthy proportion of independent 
directors. Although the chair or independent directors might have acted like the second 
psychologist or dissenting peers in Enron board meetings, they did not.  
  The Higgs Report, a British corporate governance study, suggests a reason for 
this. The biographies of British independent directors and nonexecutive chairs of 
corporate boards show that most are friends of the CEO who pass various tests of 
independence. For instance, a college room-mate, fellow club member, or neighbor 






qualifies if he has no financial dealings with the corporation; and CEOs can play games 
of tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1984) by serving as “independent” directors on each others’ boards. 
The Higgs Report recommends stronger standards of “independence” that preclude 
personal or family relationships as well as financial ties.  
  One option is to have directors certify their own independence, and face severe 
liability for misstatements. Another would remove the process of nominating directors 
from the CEO to shareholders (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999). Still another would add 
a mandate that elections for board positions always be contested.  
  Such measures must be weighed against their costs. Adams et al. (2005) show 
powerful CEOs raise firm performance variation: some outperform and others 
underperform. Always constraining CEOs may thus be inappropriate. Good governance 
requires appropriate disloyalty – voiced criticism when the CEO is making an obvious 
mistake, but not when she is enacting a visionary strategy. In practice, this distinction is 
difficult, and further research is needed to develop and resolve these issues.  
 
Dissent and Rival Authority Figures in the Shareholders Meeting  
Another way interrupting loyalty to the CEO might be to encourage voiced dissent or 
rival authority figures at shareholder meetings. One option would reorganize share 
ownership to more strongly favor institutional investors (pension funds, insurance funds, 
etc.) over individual shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) via tax or regulatory 
reforms (Cheffins, 2009). This envisions sophisticated fund managers calling out 
underperforming CEOs, and even organizing proxy contests – opposition candidates to 
replace underperforming boards (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Board election systems 
that make this easier do correlate with superior valuations (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005; 
Faleye, 2007). Black and Coffee (1994) point to Britain as an economy relying heavily on 
this approach.   
  These mechanisms also have costs. Fund managers, like CEOs, control other 
people’s money, and might likewise divert funds to maximize their own utility (Romano, 
1993). Fund managers may also be less sophisticated than commonly believed 
(Lakonishok et al. 1992).  
 
Takeovers 
An active market for corporate control is often advocated as governance improving, and 
this seems empirically founded in 1980s America (Morck et al. 1989) and more generally 
in Britain (Cheffins, 2009). This circumvents the whole issue of board loyalty to the CEO: 
weak governance depresses share prices rendering misgoverned firms “bargains” for 
raiders who buy them, fix them up, and resell them – a sort of corporate gentrification.  
  From the 1990s on, most American CEOs convinced their boards to approve 
effective takeover defenses, like poison pills and staggered director elections; and 
corporate funded lobbying changed state laws to obstruct takeovers. Firms with stronger 
takeover barriers have lower valuations (Gompers et al. 2003). Failure to account for 
excessively loyal boards may blunted takeovers as a governance-enhancing mechanism 
in America.  
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Behavioral Biases to Counter Behavioral Biases 
Information cascades – seemingly excessive conformity by rational agents economizing 
on information costs – are a potentially viable rational explanation for Milgram’s results. 
This literature explains other behavioral biases as helping damp information cascades. 
Noth and Weber (2003) see individually irrational overconfidence inducing agents to 
make their own decisions and deterring information cascades. Kübler and Weizsäcker 
(2004) observe experimental subjects overpaying for signals, and suggest this 
apparently irrational behavior likewise damps information cascades. Arya et al. (2006) 
propose that noisy information can sometimes be better than clear signals. Directors 
unsure what the CEO thinks might think for themselves.  
 
7.   Conclusions 
Milgram’s (1974) experiments suggest human nature includes an Agentic shift: a 
reflexive obedience to legitimate authorities whereby people recast themselves as 
agents, rather than autonomous decision makers. Where this reflex disposes 
subordinates and boards to support CEOs advancing wrongheaded strategies, a 
behaviorally-grounded agency problem of excessive loyalty imposes economic costs.  
  Because it connects to morally charged concepts like loyalty, trust, and duty, this 
subservience is difficult to overcome. Its moral overtone also lets people behave in 
overtly unethical ways, yet justify their behavior in terms of these charged concepts. 
Thus, managers and directors justify acquiescence to corporate fraud as loyalty, trust, 
and duty to a powerful CEO.  
  Effective governance reform overcomes both the standard economic agency 
problem of insufficient loyalty (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and this behaviorally based 
agency problem of excessive loyalty. Milgram reports that distant authorities, dissenting 
peers, and rival authorities reinitiate subjects’ rational reasoning.  
  Corporate governance reforms that distance the CEO from the board, induce 
constructive dissent at board meetings, or create rival authority figures to challenge 
errant CEOs suggest key committees suggest themselves. These include excluding 
CEOs from key board committees, populating boards with outspokenly independent 
directors, and charging a nonexecutive chair or lead independent director with a duty to 
challenge the CEO. These mechanisms are not empirically strongly correlated with 
superior corporate performance. One possible explanation is that CEOs choose 
independent directors, non-executive chairs, etc. who are likely to be loyal. Another is 
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